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Mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the football World Cup 
represent a special venue for the practice of risk management. This 
paper explores management of security risks in the case of two sporting 
mega-events, the London 2012 Olympic Games and the FIFA 2006 
World Cup in Germany. The analysis progresses in three stages. First, it 
explores three explanations that have dominated the literature on policy 
instruments and tools and introduces the generic tools of government 
approach developed by Christopher Hood (1983). Second, it reviews 
the tools used for security risk management at the two mega-events. 
Third, it evaluates competing explanations of tool choice and degree to 
which these are consistent with organisational strategies of risk 
management at the events. The findings highlight the importance of 
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Moments of crisis and the handling of post-crisis moments have attracted increased 
attention across the social sciences in recent years, in a large part as a result of 
focusing events such as 9/11, the Asian Tsunami or Hurricane Katrina. The public and 
private management of risk has likewise been subject to extensive analysis (Boin et al. 
2005, 2008; Hood et al. 2001; Power 2004, 2007; Rosenthal et al. 1989). Mega-
events, defined as ‘short-term events with long-term consequences for the cities that 
stage them … associated with the creation of infrastructure and event facilities often 
carrying long-term debts and always requiring long-term use programming’ (Roche 
1994: 1), are an important case for analysis of the management of security risks. They 
combine both scale and scope with substantial interdependencies, resource 
commitments and geopolitical significance under the watchful eye of the international 
media and publics.  
 
While literatures in public management and organisational theory have taken an 
increasing interest in the governance of risks and crises, studies of public policy have 
seen a return to analysis of policy instruments and tools. This follows an earlier period 
in the 1980s when different sets of typologies and approaches were applied to 
understand the means through which governments sought to affect and govern their 
populations (Linder and Peters 1989: 35-38). The current analytical revival revisits 
these original approaches, and considers the extent to which two decades of change 
and reform – in particular in information technology but also in other socio-economic 
and political dimensions – have impacted upon the nature of the tools of government 
and how the tool mix has changed across policy domains and states (Hood 2007: 127-
44; Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007: 1-21; Salomon 2002). 
 
This paper integrates insights from these public administration literatures to provide a 
distinct perspective on risk management. Most analyses of risk management trace 
decision-making processes, highlight organisational or operational failures, or 
advocate certain solutions or improvements to risk management strategies. This paper 
instead analyses determinants of tool choice. In other words, it attempts to improve 
understanding of the logic of choice of approaches to risk management at mega-
events. It concentrates upon the case of two sports related mega-events: the FIFA 
2006 Football World Cup in Germany and preparations for the London 2012 Olympic 
Games. The analysis also contributes insights on governance of mega-events, World 
Cups and the Olympic Games (Altshuler and David Luberoff 2003; Flyvbjerg et al. 
2002: 279-95, 2003; Hall 1989: 263-68). 
 
This paper is organised in four parts. Firstly, it explores three explanations of tool 
choice – isomorphism, functional/differentiated responses, and national political 
styles. Secondly, it introduces the tool approach to analysis of security risk 
management, borrowing from Christopher Hood’s ‘NATO’ (nodality, authority, 
treasure, and organisation) classification system of policy instruments and tools. 
Thirdly, it applies this toolbox approach to the case of security plans and operations 
for the 2006 Football World Cup and the London 2012 Olympics. The analysis of this 
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pair of events maximises leverage for possible insight: Germany and the UK are 
developed and liberal-democratic European countries that are characterised by 
differences in political institutional framework. While one event is in the past and the 
other in the future, the focus of analysis is the form and choice of tools of risk 
management rather than the success or failure of these strategies. This also enables 
insight into the diffusion or isomorphism of tools. Finally, the paper concludes with 
an assessment of the relative power of the three explanations in light of observed 
patterns of tool choice and considers the wider implications for analysis of policy 
tools (or instruments) and for risk management of security risks in particular.  
 
 
Tools for the job: different logics of tool choice 
 
Three explanations of why decision-makers choose particular policy tools rather than 
others (though these are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive) are prominent in 
the wider public policy literature (Lodge 2007: 277-79). Each of these logics is 
relevant for the analysis of mega-events, such as the Olympic Games or the football 
World Cup. In this section, these logics of tool choice are introduced along with the 
potential implications of tool choice for comparison of the particular types of mega-
event. This enables formulation of distinct expectations of the observable implications 
for the empirical analysis that follows. In the wider sense, this analysis also 
contributes to debates as to what determines policy tool choice. 
 
Tool choice as institutional isomorphism 
What makes tools of risk management so similar across different political and 
organisational contexts? In their influential analysis, DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 66) 
distinguish between three sources of institutional isomorphism – that is processes of 
appropriateness and legitimisation that cause organisations operating in the same 
environment to increasingly resemble one another, rather than to behave according to 
principles of survival of the fittest in a process of natural selection. These sources are 
coercive (existence of a central source that prescribes particular organisational 
responses), mimetic (copying or mimicking of recipes that appear legitimate or 
successful) and professional (existence of a dominant professional set of doctrines 
about how to organise).2 
 
There are reasons to suspect that isomorphism is a potential influence upon the 
governance of risk in mega-events. First of all, planning and operational decisions at 
mega-events are taken under conditions of high uncertainty and high tension, subject 
to high search costs, encouraging searches for organisational strategies that are 
perceived to be legitimate or successful. These particular sporting mega-events are 
similar in their exposure to optimism bias during the award and planning stages and to 
risk aversion in the later operational stages, each of which both distort tool selection 
in favour of existing norms, protocols and standards (Jennings and Lodge 
forthcoming). The competitive process for awarding the right to host once-in-a-
                                               
2
 DiMaggio and Powell call the third mechanism ‘normative’. 
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generation events such as the Olympics or the World Cup encourage unrealistic or 
over-optimistic bids, drawing upon the bid templates or assumptions from past bids 
and utilising pre-existing communities of knowledge and practice.  
 
This process of institutional isomorphism therefore offers a convenient solution to the 
‘impossible job’ (Boin and ’t Hart 2003: 544-53; Hargrove and Glidewell 1990) of 
organising mega-events. Such events entail numerous uncertainties concerning the 
prioritisation of specific risks, the selection of particular indicators to monitor and 
evaluate information about risks, and use of certain policies and organisational 
instruments to mitigate certain threats or hazards and modify behaviour (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005).3 While risk management in all its forms is required to balance 
different priorities, mega-events represent a special test due to their exceptional scale 
and complex nature. This is further aggravated by the rotation of event locations at the 
instruction of international authorities, restricting the pool of existing knowledge and 
expertise to a small community of experts, all of which again might be expected to 
lead to greater isomorphism. Most of all, combination of the public/media spectacle of 
mega-events with the synoptic and controlling aspirations of the regulatory state 
generate conditions that somewhat resemble Perrow’s claim that particular industries 
are confronted with tragic choices in their vulnerability to ‘normal accidents’ (Perrow 
1999). Demands for decentralised co-ordination of risk management have to be 
combined with conflicting demands for synoptic and centralised control (Moran 
2001). 
 
In addition, mega-events are global phenomena often attracting a worldwide 
television audience of billions, millions of spectators and wide-ranging public and 
media interest. In front of that kind of audience, decision-makers have little room for 
things to go wrong and little scope for adapting in response to external attacks or 
system failures. Opening ceremonies, competition schedules and venues are often 
fixed years in advance, creating added pressure for things to be ‘alright on the night’ 
and dependence upon conventional wisdom and protocol to deflect criticism. This 
setting increases the opportunities for rent-seeking. For example, essential workers in 
public services or project delivery acquire increased negotiating leverage through 
strike threats, while security professionals emphasise certain risks that need to be 
mitigated. The global dimension of mega-events also accentuates isomorphism of 
threats and hazards (in addition to the tools of risk management). This creates a 
platform for the airing of grievances or agendas where certain groups or individuals 
(e.g. anarchists, anti-globalisation protesters and terrorists) advertise their intentions 
to interrupt staging of the event, while other threats consist of intelligence chatter. 
Thus, management of security risks is confronted with the choice of which of these 
mimicked risks to discount, which to monitor, and which to mitigate and protect 
against.  
 
The rise of a risk management consultocracy since the 1980s (Power 2004) might also 
be expected to contribute to growth in the transfer of risk management tools across 
                                               
3
 This is subject to the same general kinds of cognitive and institutional biases (‘friction’) of attention 
identified in the model of disproportionate information processing.  
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international boundaries and across sporting events. There are wider pressures, then, 
for professional institutional isomorphism in governance of risk at mega-events. This 
imitation would be manifested in the presence of dominant logics of appropriateness 
or administrative protocols in the application of risk management tools (March and 
Olsen 1989, 2009). It is possible to identify potential sources of coercive forms of 
institutional isomorphism in international guidance and requirements, such as the 
2004 EU Handbook on securing against terrorist acts at major sporting events or the 
1985 European Convention on Spectator Violence at Sports Events (this document 
responded to Heysel tragedy in Brussels and the long history of English football 
hooliganism). Likewise, within the Olympic movement there are International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) standards concerning bid documents and progress 
monitoring by the IOC’s Evaluation and Coordination Commissions.  
 
Tool choice as a functional response to specific risk profiles  
In contrast to expectation of similar responses in security risk management tools, an 
alternative view of tool choice is of a response that reflects the particular attributes 
and the risk profile of the mega-event in question. Studies of regulation would 
characterise this explanation as a response of risk management to a specified 
diagnosis of market failure. Thus, tools are chosen depending on functional 
requirements of the particular event, as governments seek to economise their resource 
use. This logic suggests that decision-makers select their tools based upon careful and 
systematic gathering of information, an assessment of the target population, and 
comprehensive assessment of desired safety or security standards.  
 
Considerable variations can be identified in the organisational format of mega-events 
as well as in their exposure to risks and threats. Accordingly, these differences should 
be expected to matter in choice of tools of risk management. For example, 
international football tournaments tend to be associated with problems of public 
disorder, violence and organised hooliganism, with large crowds of national (and 
sometimes local) supporters congregating in or around urban centres for specific 
matches. This contrasts with spectators at the Olympic Games which tend to consist 
of a more diverse mix of local and transnational audiences that do not support athletes 
or teams in such a partisan and nationalist fashion. While both the Olympics and 
football World Cups are potential platforms for political demonstrations or terrorist 
attacks, such threats are more prominent in the case of the Olympics, with historical 
precedents such as riots prior to Mexico City 1968, the 1972 Munich Massacre, and 
the 1996 bombing of Centennial Park in Atlanta. The form of security conflicts and 
threats at these mega-events therefore tend to be realised in quite different forms.  
 
There are further differences in the organisational scale and complexity of events. The 
London 2012 Olympics presents an unprecedented examination for the practice of 
risk management of sporting events in the UK: hosting a total of 26 sports at 31 
competition venues over 17 days of competition, bringing together an estimated 204 
participating nations, 10,500 athletes, 6,000 coaches and officials, 20,000 media, with 
around 500,000 visitors a day to the competition venues. The Games is to be policed 
by around 15,000 police officers along with 7,500 private security staff (at current 
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estimates). This security task is of a different order from organisation to the FIFA 
2006 World Cup in Germany which consisted of some 64 matches involving 32 teams 
played in 12 stadiums in 12 different cities over a month of competition with 52,000 
spectators on average per match (3.3 million in total). 
 
Another difference is location. International football tournaments tend to be 
decentralised to multiple regions, towns and stadia, reducing the likelihood that a 
critical breakdown or security incident in one location will cause a system-wide 
disruption. At the Olympics, a significant proportion of events are held at specialist 
venues on or near the main site (which for recent Games has consisted of the athletics 
stadium, aquatics centre and the athletes’ village). The technical requirements of 
competition venues are a significant determinant of the critical impact of security 
incidents in forcing interruption or abandonment of the event. While there are in the 
region of 40 football grounds in the UK with capacity for somewhere between 20,000 
and 40,000 spectators there are just two Olympic-standard swimming pools and no 
international standard athletics stadium (with the abandonment of the Picketts Lock 
project and conversion of the City of Manchester stadium for use as a football stadium 
after the 2002 Commonwealth Games).  
 
A one-off disturbance of security – whether technological, natural, or man-made in 
origin – therefore has the capacity to disturb the staging of an Olympics far more 
extensively than a similar breach at a football tournament. Furthermore, a 
concentration of most blue-ribbon athletics events and the opening and closing 
ceremonies (which attract the largest television audiences) at one central venue makes 
the symbolic and reputational effects of breakdowns in security all the more powerful 
– although such effects would also be noticeable if an incident occurred during 
opening and final matches of the football tournament. Indeed a power outage during 
the Euro 2008 semi-final between Germany and Turkey interrupted transmission of 
the feed to television broadcasters and generated a PR problem for organisers.  
 
At international football tournaments, relative decentralisation of each of the games 
causes spectators to descend upon locations for a concentrated period of time. This 
means that large numbers of people need to be transported between locations before 
and after each game. The increased volume of passenger traffic increases strain upon 
infrastructure and introduces new risks into management of transport hubs and links. 
Given the recent fashion for public viewings on giant television screens in town 
centres and official licensing of public overflow zones for events (e.g. fan miles), 
additional security is often required to cope with the unpredictable numbers of 
spectators outside stadiums and in nearby urban centres or districts. This places a 
further strain upon policing and emergency services. As witnessed in the case of 
Glasgow Rangers’ supporters rioting and attacking local police during the UEFA Cup 
final in Manchester in May 2008, a key trigger was crowd agitation about the 
breakdown of the broadcast link to the public viewing stage in the city centre. A more 
benign example of the requirement for expanded security provision in such 
circumstances was the Dutch ‘invasion’ of Berne during the European Championship 
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in June 2008 where the arrival of more than 150,000 supporters meant that local 
restaurants ran out of food long before kick-off. 
 
There are therefore important differences in the security uncertainties and threats that 
confront the organisers of sporting mega-events. For the case of the Olympics these 
tend to concern geopolitical conflict and domestic or international terrorism. For the 
case of football World Cups and other international football tournaments, large 
crowds of national supporters (sympathising with opposing teams) create security 
risks that are manifested in public disorder or violence and based upon longstanding 
territorial-cultural rivalries and tensions. While security risk management for the 
Olympic Games tends to concern protection of critical infrastructures and trans-
national coordination of intelligence concerning specific terrorist threats, for football 
World Cups and European Championships this tends to be focused upon maintenance 
of public order and effective crowd management, often with a distinct national flavour 
to policing styles (albeit with the exchange of some intelligence between national 
agencies and support from specialist units). Thus, the Olympics involve surveillance 
of a different kind to that of international football tournaments (attempting to 
anticipate, detect and avert prospective attacks by individuals or groups), whereas the 
latter are predominantly managed as a public order concern that is reliant upon 
policing at street level, supported by cooperation between national police forces.4 
 
Unlike institutional isomorphism where decision-makers are assumed to utilise pre-
existing solutions or strategies in the face of uncertainty and high search costs –
conditions associated with bounded rationality (Simon 1957), the ‘risk profile’ 
approach predicts considerable differences in the utilisation of tools of security risk 
management. 
 
Tool choice as a result of national political systems  
Political institutions matter. This much is clear, but institutional design and 
jurisdictions determine the discretion of governments to select particular policies or 
tools (Levy and Spiller 1994: 201-46). The third logic of tool choice therefore refers 
to the effect of institutions on approaches to management of security risks. 
Comparative studies have noted the importance of policy styles and state traditions to 
government (Hall 1986; Richardson 1982). This logic suggests that political 
institutional frameworks lead to differences in tool choice, where this might be due to 
differences in state structure (federal vs. unitary states), engagement with private and 
para-public interests (pluralist vs. corporatist decision-making) or government 
formation (single-party vs. coalition government). Such variations in the institutional 
context are a potential source of differences in use of particular approaches to risk 
management.  
 
Again, considerable differences in tool choice might be expected to emerge from this 
analysis given the substantial differences between the German and UK political 
                                               
4
 Of course, football World Cups are also treated as potential targets for threats associated here with 
those of the Olympics. We are making a point regarding emphasis. 
  
 8 
systems. This contrast between cases applies both to distinction between consensus 
versus Westminster democracies (Lijphart 1999), and between the different ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice 2001). Germany is governed through its system of 
executive federalism that requires a co-operative approach towards co-ordination of 
the different state police services (Landespolizei), for example. Likewise, its 
community of emergency services (first responders) is characterised by organisational 
diversity held together by a degree of shared norms and procedural understandings. 
The unitary state in the UK (in particular in England) might be expected to have 
strong effects upon tool choice, with competition between authorities representing 
London (including the London Mayor, London local boroughs and London-specific 
public agencies), and national departments and agencies along with Olympic 
organisations and the wider Olympic movement.   
 
The mechanisms and observable implications of these different logics of tool choice 
are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Overview of logics of tool choice 
 
Mechanism Observable Implication 
Risk profiles require different responses in 
terms of economising on tool depletion 
Risk profile imposes different functional 
requirements 
 
Differences in tool utilisation in security risk 
management 
Apparently successful templates are emulated 
in conditions of high uncertainty 
Dominant professional understandings 
provide for templates for tools in risk security 
management 
 
Similarity in tool utilisation in security risk 
management 
National political institutional endowment 
requires different responses given different 
resource and ‘leverage’ allocation across the 
political system 




The toolbox: introducing the ‘NATO’ perspective 
 
So how then compare the tools of risk management? This paper employs the 
classification scheme introduced by Christopher Hood (1983) almost three decades 
ago. Hood’s theoretical framework offers a critical lens for the categorisation and 
analysis of different tools through which government interfaces with society, rooted in 
a cybernetic understanding of this relationship between the state and its citizens. This 
approach focuses on those resources available to policy-makers for gathering 
information and modifying the behaviour of its citizens. Hood distinguishes between 
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‘effecting’ and ‘detecting’ tools, i.e. those that seek to alter behaviour and those that 
seek to gather information. The government toolbox – of nodality, authority, treasure, 
and organisation (‘NATO’) – constructed by Hood and brought into the digital age by 
Hood and Margetts (2007) is outlined in Table 2.  
 
This paper combines Hood’s more generic perspective with assessment of 
determinants of tool choice, as advanced, for example, by Linder and Peters (1989: 
35-58), Salomon (2002) and Hood (2007: 127-44). The focus on resources available 
to policy-makers is essential to Hood’s toolbox approach, and is critical in identifying 
those patterns that might be predicted by explanations that focus on the effects on tool 
choice of risk profiles or institutional systems. In contrast, in a world where there are 
ambiguities concerning causes and effects and where resource implications are severe, 
it should be expected that legitimacy would be a chief resource in choice of tools, 
with decision-making processes oriented from the logic of appropriateness. 
 
Table 2: The tools of government (Hood 1983; Hood and Margetts 2007) 
 
Treasure 
Reliance on exchange of goods and money 
Nodality 
Reliance on being in the middle of an 
information network 
Organisation 
Reliance on ability to act directly 
Authority 
Reliance on possession of legal authority 
 
Nodality denotes the extent to which government is a central point or node of contact 
in information networks. This describes its capacity to receive and send information 
as well as to use information (propaganda) to modify the behaviours of actors. 
Translated into the world of security risk management, nodality refers to those 
instruments that facilitate information exchange between police and security services 
concerning the whereabouts and intentions of particular individuals or groups. It also 
refers to collection and analysis of intelligence about threats, spectators and traffic 
flows and understanding of network peaks and bottlenecks in order to redirect traffic 
and to mobilise ‘organisation’ to avoid problems. This can be equated with both 
counter-terrorism and ‘intelligent policing’. At the same time, nodality relies on 
technical devices such as centralised and interconnected databases to check ticketing 
and visiting data, especially at the various points of entry into a country (e.g. border 
controls). Nodality also includes the use of public information for visitors and citizens 
about security issues, encouraging grassroots alertness and reporting of suspect 
activity or incidents.  
 
Authority refers to the legal power of government and other sources of legitimacy. 
This refers to those tools that enable government, at all levels, the right to license, to 
demand or to prohibit certain activities. This includes censorship and procedural 
devices to limit demonstrations, as well as legal authority to deal with ticket touts, 
day-to-day criminal activities, prostitution, licensing of drinking establishments (in 
terms of hours and menu choices), and measures to impede the movement of 
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dangerous (i.e. high risk) groups or individuals such as hooligans. Overall, authority 
extends to the authorisation of planning permission and imposition of health and 
safety standards; for example with reference to the design and construction of sporting 
facilities or critical infrastructures i.e. transport, energy, communications and water 
networks. 
 
Treasure denotes the access of government to assets and financial resources. This is 
often observed as financial subsidies and tax receipts that modify individual 
behaviour. In the context of security risk management, use of ‘fungible chattels’ 
concerns the application of financial strength for purposes of direct expenditure on 
security or indirect provision of insurance and assurance services (with the 
government acting as lender of last resort). This also refers to public spending on 
construction and operation of buildings, such as stadiums, into which security 
capacity and responses can be hardwired through design or architecture. Treasure is 
also required for payment of mercenaries e.g. private security firms contracted to 
provide support for public security and defence services and funding of third-sector 
emergency services (charities) that are not directly part of the government apparatus, 
but exist somewhere in the twilight zone between public and private sectors. 
 
Lastly, organisation refers to the capacity of government for undertaking direct 
action, for example in its mobilisation of bureaucrats or the armed forces. This refers 
to the physical ability of government to intervene in the affairs of its citizens or other 
states or otherwise to act as a deterrent. As such, it concerns the direct presence of 
security services but extends to design and configuration of event architecture in a 
broader sense and operation of technologies of social control that sometimes intersect 
with information-gathering functions. This includes devices that reduce bottlenecks, 
such as in the case of transportation, or create them, such as in the management of 
visitor flows and exercise of entrance controls (turnstiles). Likewise it refers to the 
setting of boundaries or construction of perimeters to separate groups or demarcate a 
particular area as subject to special security status. 
 
 
Comparing security risk management tools  
 
Comparing the security risk management tools of two mega-events in two countries 
invites the criticism of comparing apples with oranges. As noted above, however, 
both of these are clearly sporting mega-events (they are both fruit – analysis is not 
comparing apples with polar bears) and, if arguments regarding isomorphism are 
correct, then some degree of cross-reading across these events should be expected. 
Mega-events are, by definition, quite exceptional due to their bespoke organisational 
design, which encourages a false belief that general comparisons and lessons cannot 
be drawn. The objection that ‘risk’ and ‘risk management’ are words reserved for the 
Anglo-Saxon administrative space can also be rejected. The internal and external 
documents published for the FIFA 2006 World Cup (in German) and the local 
German ‘security/emergency management’ community endorsed the risk management 
approach (the official title was Sicherheitsmanagement – ‘security management’ – but 
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the approach was informed by Anglo-Saxon risk management language and 
methodology). Such a concern also points to a wider discussion as to what is meant by 
the term ‘risk’. In this paper, risk is defined in its classic form and is used to identify 
incidents with potential to interrupt the running of a mega-event rather than as an 
organising principle that shapes the exercise of particular tool (a risk-based approach 
towards the employment of security personnel, for example). 
 
The direct comparison of security at these events is further complicated because one 
has passed with minimal incident and the other is still in a state of planning and 
preparation. At the 2006 World Cup disturbances were only recorded in the context of 
three matches (Poland-Germany, England-Sweden and England-Ecuador). Three 
streaking incidents (‘Flitzer’) were also noted. Such a non-eventful outcome was 
replicated by the organisers of the UEFA 2008 European Football Championships 
(two ‘Flitzer’ incidents). In contrast, the management of security risks for the London 
2012 Olympics is still in a state of evolution, although a clear organising template is 
in place. The purpose of analysis is to understand better the form and choice of tools 
of risk management rather than the success or failure of these strategies. Indeed, 
whether or not a security incident occurs at a given mega-event does not necessarily 
indicate the flaws in the logic of appropriateness or the particular risk management 
tool employed. There is such a thing as bad luck, even in the world of risk. 
 
Nodality 
As noted, nodality tools seek to extract and utilise information for the achievement of 
particular objectives. Most prominent across the two mega-events was the use of 
nodality for the detection of specific security threats, in particular by locking the local 
event(s) into the wider information exchange across national and international police 
forces.  
 
In the case of the 2006 World Cup, Germany built upon bilateral agreements with 36 
other countries. These mechanisms had already been utilised in previous European 
tournaments as well as at the Athens 2004 Olympics. As such, the security risk 
management strategy utilised ongoing and existing information flows that had already 
started to focus on particular fan groups (i.e. hooligans). As central nodal point, the 
German federal government operated a National Information and Cooperation Centre 
(NICC) to collect and summarise information and to disseminate it across the various 
locations in which the tournament was taking place.5 Other nodality mechanisms 
operated as effectors, in particular to survey and manage road traffic flows (the 
SOCCER transport research project), more importantly, accreditation and ticketing 
were utilised to inform security measures and to steer traffic flows (for example, 
tickets not only provided for access to matches, but also to public transport and 
contained information regarding road access to stadiums).  
                                               
5
 See < http://wm2006.deutschland.de/EN/Content/SharedDocs/Downloads/seventh-progress-report-
fifa-world-cup,property=publicationFile.pdf >  
(overview: < http://wm2006.deutschland.de/EN/Content/SharedDocs/Downloads/  >) 
These arrangements were arguably less problematic to set up than those that were attempted in the case 




In staging of the Olympics, high-level security arrangements tend to be superimposed 
over existing national and international infrastructures of intelligence exchange and 
defence capacities, albeit dependent upon the sometimes unique geopolitical context 
(i.e. the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games involved less formal/direct international co-
operation on intelligence matters than Athens 2004). For London 2012, existing 
intelligence agencies (such as the Joint Intelligence Committee, MI5, MI6, GCHQ, 
and the Defence Intelligence Staff) intersect with a number of Olympic-specific 
coordinating organisations: in particular the Cabinet-level Olympic Security 
Committee and the Metropolitan Police’s Olympic Security Directorate (OSD). An 
Intelligence Unit has been established within the OSD to gather and share information 
between security stakeholders for London 2012.  
 
In addition to this UK-specific coordination, there are also transnational arrangements 
for intelligence gathering. For each Olympics since Atlanta 1996, organisers have 
created an Olympic Intelligence Centre (OIC) to assimilate information and risk 
assessments for intelligence of Olympic interest through cooperation and information-
sharing protocols involving over a hundred countries and international organisations. 
Whereas football tournaments tend to adhere to a relatively hierarchical structure of 
intelligence analysis, there are multiple centres in the Olympic governance of security 
risks. This creates a greater capacity for information gathering and a more diverse set 
of intelligence sources, but at the same time adds noise to the information signal that 
reaches analysts. This difference reflects, at least in part, the relative asymmetry of the 




As noted, authority relates to tools that build on the force of legal authority, such as 
licensing, prohibitions and other type of orders. The exercise of authority is essential 
to security arrangements at both the Olympics and football World Cups and authority 
as a tool is prominent in particular as effector.  
 
The organising committees for both types of events are usually established as private 
law companies and associations (e.g. the German Football Association [DFB]), 
operating, however, with the support of public agencies (at various levels of 
government) for the provision of infrastructure, security and other essential services.6 
In the German case, the use of authority as effector is particularly problematic as 
security is mostly an issue of the state level. As a result, security risk management 
was largely managed through a wider politico-intergovernmental process in which the 
lead ministry, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, developed the agenda in agreement 
with the interior ministries of the Länder. The only aspect in which the federal level 
was able to utilise its legal authority was in re-instating border controls and thereby 
being able to reject entry to particular individuals associated with security risks (i.e. 
                                               
6
 We are not considering here the use of legal authority to suspend work permit, working hours, or 
customs clearance regulations. 
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hooligans). In addition, stadiums were often in private-law hands, further 
complicating the ability to steer hierarchically through law. Public viewing events 
were steered through licensing and other security standards. Security was dominated 
by negotiated solutions within the intergovernmental process, as well as in the 
network of emergency responders, headed by a federal agency, the Technisches 
Hilfswerk (see below).7 
 
Given that the football World Cup involved the use of existing stadium 
infrastructures, there was a substantial contrast to the type of legal authority required 
for planning purposes that had to be utilised for the 2012 Olympics. Nevertheless, 
stadium modernisation (as organised through the private or municipal owners of the 
stadiums, with the exceptions of Berlin and Leipzig) followed the international 
standards in terms of stadium safety and access. 
 
The special legal framework enacted for staging the London 2012 Olympic Games 
created a fragmented set of jurisdictions and responsibilities across the Olympic 
Delivery Authority (ODA), London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games 
(LOCOG) and Metropolitan Police (within the Home Office). Such an institutional 
framework is a potential source of ambiguity and tension over responsibilities for 
management of security risks associated with infrastructure and operations – with 
distinction between on-site and off-site risks and between pre-games and games-time 
risks. While infrastructure and venues are to be constructed by the ODA, established 
under the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006, and the events 
are to be operated by LOCOG, a private company owned by the government, security 
for the Games entails a complex network of public and private organisations that 
intrudes upon multiple jurisdictions, responsibilities and legal powers. For example, 
the allocation of legal responsibilities for delivery and operation means that those 
organisations responsible for security do not have formal access to the main site until 
the ODA hands it over (expected to be in 2011). Such divisions can trigger 
differences in risk prioritisation.  
 
While the various police, security and emergency services for the London 2012 
Olympics operate within particular jurisdictions, they are co-ordinated through a 
single Olympic command structure.8 This is typical of the traditional hierarchical, 
state-dominated character of the Westminster system where central government is 
responsible for securing London 2012 despite the lead role of LOCOG in staging the 
Games and the ODA in delivering the main venues. The ODA and LOCOG retain 
certain authorities over integration of security in design of infrastructure and 
stadiums, and protocols or technologies such as ticketing and on-site checks. 
However, the Cabinet-level Olympic Security Committee, chaired by the Home 
Secretary and consisting of representatives of UK security and resilience agencies, is 
                                               
7
 Apart from the federal complication, there was a further inherent tension (termed a ‘highly delicate 
form of co-operation’) in terms of the ownership of the World Cup, with the international football 
association’s (FIFA) legal contracts taking priority over those signed by the German association. 
However, this highly delicate form of co-operation mainly concerned issues of sponsorship rather than 
the provision of security risk management measures. 
8
 See London 2012 bid (2004).  
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the ultimate authority concerning security matters and inter-agency coordination. At 
the same time, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is responsible for 
planning and operational matters that concern terrorism and policing in London. 
While the police and MI5 report to the Home Secretary, MI6 reports to the Foreign 
Secretary and the armed forces report to the Defence Secretary. As such, political 
authority over security organisation for London 2012 rests at cabinet level and comes 
with pre-existing legal and institutional capabilities and powers.  
 
Organisation 
The tool of organisation reflects the physical presence of the state in intervening 
directly in security risk management. This can either occur through the use of 
‘security’ forces, the utilisation of emergency support and/or through the use of 
architecture more broadly. As such organisation is utilised both as effector and 
detector. 
 
In the case of the football World Cup, all the three mechanisms (security forces, 
emergency support and ‘architecture’) were utilised to a considerable extent, requiring 
however extensive intergovernmental co-ordination processes.9 In the case of 
policing, the main ‘safety’ framework was co-ordinated through a ‘Stab’ (special unit) 
in the Federal Ministry of the Interior that however operated through the normal 
operating procedures of federal-Land (state) co-operation (the standing committee of 
interior ministers). A sub-committee dealt with the particular issue of policing and 
crime, thereby accessing directly tools of nodality. However, in addition, it utilised 
close co-operation with other national police force: 570 foreign police were active in 
Germany to monitor fans and inform German security forces.   
 
In terms of non-policing security measures, the Länder were solely responsible for 
fire brigade, rescue and emergency services. However, the overall co-ordination 
operated through two federal agencies, the Technisches Hilfswerk, which was largely 
in control of emergency services, in particular in terms of infrastructures 
(communications, electricity), and the Bundesanstalt für Bevölkerungsschutz und 
Katastrophenhilfe which provided extra equipment as well as training for local 
emergency services. The army was also utilised to provide medical services as well as 
providing a background ‘policing role’ which however was not called upon.  
 
‘Organisation’ was not just a matter of personnel, but was also provided through 
stadium architecture and the careful planning of transport access routes (again 
providing for a strong link to nodality). A crucial difference to events such as the 
Olympics was not just that the stadiums were regularly used for football matches, but 
that the running of the so-called Confederations Cup also provided for insights into 
potential security risks (a report that has not been published).  
 








For the London 2012 Olympics, the network of organisations and manpower involved 
in security operations is complex and extensive. With high-level coordination from 
the cabinet-level OSC, a range of government agencies will deploy their 
organisational resources with respect to certain tasks. MI5 and other intelligence 
services are to gather, disseminate and advice on intelligence matters, the 
Metropolitan Police and regional police forces are to provide policing, law 
enforcement and emergency responses (possibly with support from the armed forces), 
and the London Resilience Team10 are responsible for contingency and consequence 
management planning, such as the London mass fatality plan.11  
 
The demands of a considerable security presence can strain the resources of Olympic 
organisers. At Athens 2004, heightened security concerns after the events of 9/11 
meant that there were around 70,000 police on patrol in Athens and at the Olympic 
venues, necessitating external support in terms of presence from NATO as well as the 
European Union. At up to 14,800, the projected number of police for the London 
2012 Games is far lower (with additional support from 6,500 private security 
contractors),12 reflecting its reliance upon intelligence gathering and processing 
instead of policing for Olympics compared with international football tournaments. 
That number is not insignificant, however, since it represents about 10% of the total 
of UK police manpower. 
 
Organisation also refers to the set of features that, like transport, determines the 
physical spacing, timing and structure of crowd flows and security provisions, as well 
as facilitating control and responsiveness in the case of incidents. For example, there 
is an increasing standardisation in stadium designs and emphasis upon the importance 
of creating similar response environments so that first responders in emergency 
situations do not require extensive familiarisation with peculiarities of each location, 
such as in relation to exit routes, evacuation plans and so forth. There is also a high 
degree of standardisation of event schedules for sports events such as World Cups and 
Olympics, through guidance of international organisations such as FIFA and the IOC. 
The Olympic Village to house all athletes and support staff at London 2012 is to be 
located within the Olympic Park area, creating a general perimeter that requires 
securing although there will be different levels of security within the Olympic Park. 
As most of the blue-ribbon events are to take place in the Park – at the main stadium 
and aquatics centre – this leads to a concentration of security efforts at a single site.  
 
However, in contrast to the enclosed architecture of football stadia, the main Olympic 
site tends to be more open and less structured in design with multiple venues, open 
spaces and interchanges. Whilst it still requires policing of its perimeter to manage 
security threats (in particular near the site entrances), there is a greater emphasis upon 
randomised and ‘intelligent’ surveillance inside the site. This means security presence 
tends to be less concentrated and, therefore, less visible. So whilst breaches of the 
secure perimeter in football stadia are more transparent to onlookers, the multi-




 London Mass Fatality Plan, http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk/downloads/LMFPMainBodyV2.pdf  
12
 London 2012 bid (2004). Chapter 12, p.39.  
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centred layout of the Olympic site presents a more complex challenge for mobilising 
intelligence and presence for the purposes of security.  
 
The tool of organisation also takes the form of direct technological devices and 
controls used by government, often intersecting with intelligence-based strategies. 
Indeed, the Metropolitan Police have said that the ‘first line’ of Olympic security for 
London 2012 is the installation of a ‘technological footprint’ across London, such as 
CCTV, smart ticketing and automatic ID-recognition for both people and vehicles.13 
The ODA has sought tenders for the main Olympic site for a ‘Command and 
Perimeter Security System’ consisting of security lighting; intruder detection, access 
control and alarm systems; automatic number plate recognition; a command, control 
and communication infrastructure (C3i) integrated system; data network equipment; 
and associated security systems, information and communication technology and 
accommodation. The plans for 2012 also involve pedestrian screening areas (with an 
airport style security check of the person and any bags or equipment) and vehicle 
checkpoints to control the flow of authorised vehicles. Security scanners at the 
entrance to public transport or competition venues provide off-site and on-site 
turnstiles for control on visitors and ticket-holders that are intended to filter out 
threats and disrupt black markets in ticketing. 
 
Treasure 
As noted, treasure is defined by the use of ‘fungible chattels’ to effect and detect 
behaviour. In both cases under consideration, treasure was largely used to effect 
behaviour. 
 
In the case of the football World Cup in Germany, it is difficult to come to any form 
of estimate as to expenditures that were specifically invested into security risk 
management as responsibility was, as noted, diffused between levels of government 
and between private and public parties. Federal investment in transport infrastructure 
was made independent of the World Cup (estimated to be €3.7bn). There was some 
support for the modernisation of two stadiums (Berlin and Leipzig, nearly €250m), 
while the full economic cost for the use of the Bundeswehr (the German army) was 
estimated to have been about €4.4m. Other measures, such as the use of the federal 
police were budgeted through normal budget lines, while the use of NATO 
reconnaissance flights was paid for through the NATO budget (as had been the case 
with the 2004 Olympics and European championships). Indeed, the financial risk of 
the overall event was with the organising committee, and therefore lay purely with the 
German football association. The federal government did not play the role as lender of 
last resort. The overall event provided for a substantial profit for the German football 
association.  
 
For the London 2012 Olympics, treasure is constituted both in direct expenditure by 
public bodies (e.g. ODA) and expenditure by private or quasi-private organisations 
                                               
13
 Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Tarique Ghaffur, quoted on BBC Online, 10 April 
2008, ‘Torch lessons for 2012 Olympic security’. 
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(e.g. LOCOG) on public goods (e.g. security) funded through commercial activities 
such as ticket sales and sponsorship. The overall security budget is the responsibility 
of government, with the exception of security for the Olympic site in the Lea Valley. 
The latter, a fraction of the total, is to be funded through LOCOG’s revenue from 
tickets, sponsorship and merchandise. The burgeoning budget for Olympic security in 
2012 illustrates how financing of security management is a significant concern for the 
organisers of sporting mega-events. The initial feasibility study for a London bid 
included a ‘provisional sum for the cost of all security for the Olympics following 
consultation with the Metropolitan Police and based on the experience of Sydney 
2000 and Salt Lake City 2002’ (ARUP 2002a: 3-4), at a cost of £160.2 million 
(ARUP 2002b: 98). ARUP (2002b: 95) reported that ‘with more time to plan security 
for a 2012 Games, the costs are not likely to reach those incurred at Salt Lake City 
[£245 million]’. Site security was costed at £190 million in the bid, increased to £268 
million in the revised March 2007 budget which put the total/wider security and 
policing cost at £600 million (House of Commons 2008: 9). Since then, security costs 
have been reported to reach £1.5 billion (Beard 2008).  
 
The public costs associated with securing the Games are a contested topic. In part this 
is because the Games are a national defence issue, and is not easily disbursed to the 
host OCOG or metropolitan government. The fixed costs of policing, intelligence and 
defence manpower might remain relatively stable, although these are diverted to the 
Games for a concentrated period of time. Furthermore, while comparison between 
different Olympics is a difficult business, it is evident that the cost of security at the 
Olympics has grown over the past 30 years, and dramatically since Sydney 2000 – 
with the events of 9/11 (Wall Street Journal, 22 August 2004).   
 
In some political contexts, such as Beijing 2008, the lack of transparency over the 
actual security budget disguises the brute strength of the security provisions. Treasure 
tools for London 2012 also entail use of private contractors with responsibilities for 
security controls at Olympic venues, provision of spectator services staff, and 
operation of access control and ‘mag-and-bag’ (magnetometer and baggage) searches. 
 
An alternative form of treasure is insurance. Prior to the events of 9/11, Salt Lake City 
2002 took out cancellation cover with Lloyd’s of London. Since then, insurance 
premiums for sporting mega-events have risen sharply as projected security risks have 
proliferated. For the first time, for Athens 2004, the IOC purchased $170 million 
cover for cancellation insurance to protect against financial losses of cancellation due 
to terrorism or natural disaster with the premium reported to approximate $6.8 million 
(Buck 2004). This rose to $415 million cover for Beijing 2008, at reported premium 
of $9.4 million (Lenckus 2008), and can be expected to rise again for London 2012. 
As such, treasure mechanisms are used to protect against security risks that also pose 
treasure risks in terms of the financial viability of the Games. Thus, insurance 
functions as a form of asset protection and remediation, instead of security functions 





Table 3: Tools of security risk management at the London 2012 Olympics  





Insurance cover  
Private security contractors 
Defence expenditure 




Olympic Intelligence Centre 
Risk assessments 
Knowledge transfer programmes 
World Cup 
Public-private expenditure 
German Football Association 
NATO funding of reconnaissance 
 
World Cup 
National Information and Cooperation Centre 
Bilateral agreements 
Hooligan databases 










Special legal protection (i.e. Olympics Act) 
Private operating company 
Central government (unitary system) 
International governance (IOC) 
Cabinet-level coordination of strategy 
World Cup 







Private operating company 
Federal-state government 
Immigration controls 














What has been the added value of the tools of government perspective in 
understanding of security risk management at sporting mega-events? What do the 
observed patterns tell us about the politics of tool choice? And what value do these 
two questions have for wider interest in analysis of mega-events, and the FIFA 
Football World Cup and Olympic Games in particular? 
 
Turning first to the question of the added value of the tools of government 
perspective, this analysis has demonstrated that the ‘NATO’ framework provides a 
systematic and insightful means for classification and comparison of the strategies 
employed by governments in securing mega-events. As an empirical analysis, this has 
moved towards a more institutional emphasis than Hood’s original framework, but 
nevertheless the tools of government perspective provides an approach that highlights 
differences and similarities between cases that might otherwise be missed. Being 
forced to focus on four tools facilitates this systematic comparison. Using categories 
for the study of risk management in general not only provides for a more systematic 
comparison, but also for a more careful consideration of tool choice. For example, the 
emphasis on organisation in the two cases illustrates the complex and differentiated 
means through which governments seek to exercise visible control over security 
threats. Likewise, emphasis upon authority highlights the substantial differences in the 
resources available to the unitary UK state in contrast to its federal German 
counterpart. Thus, even with modification of the tools of government approach, there 
are analytical and empirical benefits of application of the ‘NATO’-lens to categorise 
and compare the different approaches to security risk management.  
 
In terms of tool choice, the paper introduced three well-known public policy 
explanations: institutional isomorphism, functional response to differing risk profiles 
and responses defined by national political systems. These alternative explanations of 
tool choice offer contrasting expectations as to what kind of patterns of tool choice 
might be expected for security risk management. As far as institutional isomorphism 
is concerned, there is limited evidence of cross-reading between the Olympics and the 
World Cup – in other words, there was limited evidence of the presence of causal 
mechanisms across the two mega-events associated with institutional isomorphism. 
Some replication of strategies was evident in terms of references to international 
security arrangements, but these tended to be generic. There does not appear to be an 
overarching sporting mega-event consultocracy that applies its recipes across events.  
 
Such a finding is both surprising given the existence of national communities of (risk) 
practice. Perhaps linguistic and other barriers impede the transfer of experiences from 
one context to the other. The closed nature of national intelligence and security 
communities is another possible restraint to the isomorphism of security operations 
beyond the level of established international co-operation provisions (such as for 
policing).14 While diffusion exists across football events and across Olympics, little 
                                               
14
 Indeed, the closed nature of the intelligence world makes research into such networks of diffusion 
difficult, and might therefore lead to an under-reporting of isomorphic outcomes. 
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cross-reading takes place. Whether this is a result of the demands of different 
international bodies (IOC and FIFA) or of the perceived differences across the two 
events is difficult to tell, because when confronted with the similarities of the two 
mega-events (as illustrated above), actors clearly regarded them as comparable. 
Similarly, time does not seem to matter. Of course, critical junctures such as 9/11 or 
terror incidents during Olympics matter and provide for lessons, but they do not seem 
to provide for a basis that connects the demands on tool choice across mega-events. 
There is no unifying logic of tool choice that links together the events of Munich 1972 
and Atlanta 1996 with planning for London 2012. The 7th July 2005 bombings, a day 
after the award of the Games, and British counter-terrorism policy in general, are a far 
more important reference point for local security than strategies put in place at Beijing 
2008 or Vancouver 2010. 
 
Instead, the evidence suggests that tools for security risk management in these cases 
evolve specific to the requirements of the specific sporting mega-event. This seems to 
reflect the distinct risk profile of each of the events – with differences in the use of 
organisation in particular reflecting the distinction between centralised and 
decentralised securing of the mega-event. Banning orders restricting the travel of 
football hooligans is not a relevant or appropriate tool in securing the Olympics – 
although there are similar requirements of border control and monitoring. The 
institutional framework of security also does not quite reflect differences in risk 
profiles.  
 
The observed differences are not just function responses to the logic of the different 
risk profiles of these events, but also relate to the importance of national political 
systems in shaping tool choice. This is not altogether surprising. Political institutions 
allocate resources and therefore bestow legal and financial power to particular tools of 
risk management. Institutional jurisdictions also determine who is responsible for 
management of particular security risks – with consequences for the blame avoiding 
strategies of policy-makers and bureaucrats (Hood 2002: 15-37). At the same time, 
this also highlights a more general conclusion – that the political dimension of tool 
choice applies not just in terms of consequences of when things go wrong, but also in 
the close connection between aspirations to securitise mega-events and the world of 
high politics. The aim of government, in its regulatory form, is to eradicate risk and 
maximise social control. This suggests that despite the analytical value of generic 
classifications and theories of tool choice, empirical analysis of tools will never be 
able to detach itself from a close understanding of the political institutional context in 
which tool choice is conducted.  
 
What does this discussion contribute to the wider study of mega-events and the 
Olympic Games and World Cups? For one, much of the discussion regarding these 
types of events has focused upon their symbolic, urban and cultural aspects and 
subsequent difficulties of how to manage such projects. Most football World Cups are 
remembered for the quality of football and the ultimate winner. The Olympics Games 
tend to be associated with headline-generating incidents and the visitor (and media) 
experience of the host city as well as with athletes’ achievements on the track and 
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field. Such interests are perfectly legitimate. This paper has, in contrast, sought to 
advance understanding of risk governance of the World Cup, Olympics and mega-
events in two respects. The first is to encourage – at a practical level – comparison 
between mega-events through the lens of tools that allow for systematic and detailed 
comparison of organisation. The limited extent to which the football World Cup and 
Olympics transferred strategies between one another is interesting both as a finding 
but also when considering the extent to which these mega-events share particular risk 
properties. On a conceptual level, this paper’s integration of literatures on the tools of 
government and risk management at mega-events advances the discussion through 
enabling direct and clear comparison when most empirical analyses take the form of 
single-case studies. This promotes not just an analytical discussion of the tools and 
instruments of government in a fragmented domain, but also offers a new approach to 
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